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In this paper, we investigate properties of some multi-particle entangled states and, from the
properties applying the secret sharing present a new type of quantum key distribution protocols
as generalization of quantum key distribution between two persons. In the protocols each group
can retrieve the secure key string, only if all members in each group should cooperate with one
another. We also show that the protocols are secure against an external eavesdropper using the
intercept/resend strategy.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
The computational power of quantum computers has
threatened classical cryptosystems. For example, public
key cryptosystems, such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman pub-
lic key cryptosystem [1], can be broken by quantum com-
puters to be able to perform the fast factorization. On
the other hand, quantum mechanical phenomena provide
us a new kind of cryptosystems, called quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD), from which we can in principle obtain
perfectly random and secure key strings.
The first quantum cryptographic protocol was pre-
sented by Bennett and Brassard [2] and their protocol
bore the acronym BB84. In 1991, Ekert [3] proposed a
QKD protocol using entangled particles. It was modi-
fied by Bennett, Brassard, and Mermin [4]. Let us call
the modified version the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
protocol. The EPR protocol is a QKD between two per-
sons using an EPR pair of spin 1
2
particles in the state
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉).
Using the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state
1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉) [5] the secret sharing protocol was pre-
sented by Hillery, Buzˇek and Berthiaume [6]. In this pro-
tocol, Alice distributes the information on a key to Bob
and Charlie. And the key can be restored only when their
information are collected by them.
In this paper, applying the secret sharing protocol, we
generalize the EPR protocol on noiseless channels by the
properties of several cat states [7] and then obtain QKD
protocols between group A and group B. In each group
the information of a secret key is distributed to all mem-
bers. After the process for recovery of the key, the two
groups get the secret key. And the protocols require each
member’s approval and cooperation. Furthermore, when
some members try to affect the shared bit adversely, if
the shared key does not have the correct correlation (or
anti-correlation) then it should be revealed to others in
the test step. Any external eavesdropper should also be
detected even if several members assist the eavesdropper.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we
investigate some properties of several cat states. The
QKD protocol between two groups and its modification
are presented in Section 3. We analyze the security for
the protocol in Section 4.
II. NONORTHOGONAL CAT STATES
Let us begin with reviewing cat states [7]. The t-
particle cat state is defined as a entangled state of the
type
t⊗
i=1
|ui〉 ±
t⊗
i=1
|uci〉 (1)
whereby ui stands for the binary variable in {0, 1}, and
uci = 1 − ui. Furthermore, Equation (1) becomes one of
the Bell states when t = 2 and one of the GHZ states
when t = 3.
From now on, we use the following several cat states:
∣∣Φ±t 〉 = 1√2 (
⊗t
i=1 |0〉 ±
⊗t
i=1 |1〉) (2)∣∣Λ±t 〉 = 1√2 (
⊗t
i=1 |0〉 ± i
⊗t
i=1 |1〉). (3)
We define |0〉x =
∣∣Φ+1 〉, |1〉x = ∣∣Φ−1 〉, |0〉y = ∣∣Λ+1 〉, and
|1〉y =
∣∣Λ−1 〉.
For n = k+ l, we notice the states in Equation (2) and
(3) have the following relations:
∣∣Φ±n 〉AB = 1√2
(∣∣Φ+k 〉A
∣∣Φ±l 〉B +
∣∣Φ−k 〉A
∣∣Φ∓l 〉B
)
(4)
= 1√
2
(∣∣Λ+k 〉A
∣∣Λ∓l 〉B +
∣∣Λ−k 〉A
∣∣Λ±l 〉B
)
, (5)∣∣Λ±n 〉AB = 1√2
(∣∣Φ+k 〉A
∣∣Λ±l 〉B +
∣∣Φ−k 〉A
∣∣Λ−l 〉B
)
(6)
= 1√
2
(∣∣Λ+k 〉A
∣∣Φ±l 〉B +
∣∣Λ−k 〉A
∣∣Φ∓l 〉B
)
. (7)
When G is a group of t persons, assume that, for one
of the above four cat states, each person takes its one
particle and measure in the x- or y-direction. Firstly we
letNGy be the number of members modulo 4 who measure
2in the y-direction,MGy =
⌊
NGy
2
⌋
, and PG the sum of the
measurement outcome of all members modulo 2. Then
the following results are obtained.
(a) Suppose NGy is even. Then PG⊕MGy is 0 for
∣∣Φ+t 〉,
and it is 1 for
∣∣Φ−t 〉, where a ⊕ b ≡ a + b (mod 2)
for any a, b ∈ N.
(b) Suppose NGy is odd. Then PG⊕MGy is 0 for
∣∣Λ+t 〉,
and it is 1 for
∣∣Λ−t 〉.
Also, it is noticed that if the above suppositions of NGy
are not satisfied, PG ⊕MGy becomes 0 or 1 with proba-
bility 1
2
i.e. it has no rules.
Using an induction on t the proof of such facts is given.
To begin with, for t = 1 it is trivial. Assume that these
statements are true for t− 1. The cat state ∣∣Φ+t 〉 is con-
sidered. Let NGy be even. Equation (4) implies
∣∣Φ+t 〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉x∣∣Φ+t−1〉+ |1〉x∣∣Φ−t−1〉) . (8)
If any one member takes measurement in the x-
direction and obtains 0 then NGy = NG
′
y and NG
′
y will
be even, where G′ is the group of all members except
that member. From Equation (8) MG′y ⊕ PG
′ ≡ 0
and PG = PG′ . Thus MGy ⊕ PG ≡ 0. Otherwise,
MG′y ⊕ PG
′ ≡ 1 by (8) and PG ≡ PG′ ⊕ 1. Thus
MGy ⊕ PG ≡ 0.
On the other hand, for the case that the member takes
a measurement in the y-direction, the proof is similar to
the above case. Hence, we hold that MGy ⊕ PG ≡ 0.
That is, the previous assumption holds for t. For other
cat states, all of the proofs are similar.
Now, we consider two parties, A and B, that consist
of k members and l members, respectively. Applying
the previously described properties of the cat states, we
obtain the Table I.
III. PROTOCOLS
By means of the properties of the cat states, we de-
scribe the QKD protocols between two groups. We first
discuss how two groups proceed to share the secret key
string. Next, by modifying several steps we show to be
able to use the cat states efficiently.
A. Protocol
In this section, we present a QKD protocol between
two groups, A and B, that consist k (k > 1) members
and l (l > 2) members respectively. From here, with
n = k + l we use the n-particle cat states and suppose
that all members are arbitrarily ordered . For each shared
bit, each group requires a member who collects the in-
formation that has been distributed to all members. We
call such members the ‘collectors’. We present one of the
methods to collect the information after description of
the protocol. We presume that a collector chooses the
used cat state and its information is possessed by only
the collector. However, if secure classical channels among
members in A exists, all members in A may share the in-
formation on demand and then may choose the cat state
together under their agreement.
1. A collector in A randomly chooses an n-particle cat
state out of |Φ±n 〉 and |Λ±n 〉 which is denoted by |S〉.
Each particle of |S〉 is transmitted to each member
of the two groups.
2. Each member of the two groups randomly performs
a measurement on his own particle either in the x-
or y-direction, respectively.
3. Each member in the two groups announces the ba-
sis he used through the public channel, but not the
result he obtained, . The two groups, A and B, ob-
tain NAy and NBy , respectively. We call the member
who finally announces the basis in each group the
‘last member’ Here, the announcement of the last
member in A should be followed by B’s.
4. Two groups, A and B, collect the outcomes to ob-
tain PA and PB, respectively, and then obtain the
shared bit MAy ⊕ PA and MBy ⊕ PB, respectively.
The last member is never the collector and it will
be discussed in Section IVB.
In order to obtain the key bit strings, the two
groups should repeat the above steps a sufficient
number of times.
5. The two groups have a public discussion on a set
of bits used to detect an eavesdropper’s presence.
For the test bits, A reveals PA and is followed by
B. The reason will be treated in Section IVB.
6. A announces the cat states |S〉 that were chosen at
first. For |S〉 = |Φ±n 〉, if NAy +NBy is even, then the
shared bit will be kept, and otherwise, it will be
discarded. In case |S〉 = |Λ±n 〉, if NAy +NBy is odd,
it will be kept, and otherwise, it will be discarded.
So the two groups keep it with probability 1
2
.
With a set of test bits, the two groups make inde-
pendently a test to detect the presence of eaves-
droppers or the faulty bit string made by some
members who behave wrong.
If an error exists, all shared keys should be dis-
carded, and the two groups should go back to Step
1. Otherwise, they go on the next step.
We suggest a method of obtaining PA (or PB). Here,
we consider the first member as a collector and all op-
erations are module 2. The collector chooses a random
3TABLE I: Relations between outcomes of A and B.
A B
N
A
y +N
B
y N
A
y M
A
y + P
A
N
B
y M
B
y + P
B
∣∣Φ+n 〉(∣∣Φ−n 〉) even
even
0
even
0(1)
1 1(0)
odd
0
odd
1(0)
1 0(1)
∣∣Λ+n 〉(∣∣Λ−n 〉) odd
even
0
odd
0(1)
1 1(0)
odd
0
even
0(1)
1 1(0)
FIG. 1: Obtaining P = PA or PB: Ei is the outcome of the
i-th member, R is the random bit chosen by the collector, and
m is the number of all members.
bit ‘R’, adds it to his outcome, and sends the result to
the second member. The second member adds his own
outcome to the received one, and then gives it to the next
member. This procedure is continued until the collector
receives PA(or PB)⊕R. After that, the collector finally
takes PA(or PB), which is PA(or PB)⊕R⊕R (see Figure
1).
If each member plays a role of the collector in rotation,
all secret key string should be divided among all mem-
bers with the same portion. If without rotation just one
member always plays the collector, the protocol may be
similar to the EPR protocol. However, even in such a
case it is not the same as the EPR protocol in the aspect
of requiring all members’ approval. For instance, a mes-
sage from another group is never decrypted without all
members’ agreement.
B. Modified protocol with a chairperson
In the previous protocol, each shared bit is discarded
with probability 1
2
in Step 6. By modifying a method
to perform the measurement in the previous protocol,
the cat states can efficiently be used, i.e., the number
of shared bits which are discarded can be decreased. In
here, we assume that k > 1 and l > 1. In the modi-
fied protocol, a specific member, called the ‘chairperson’,
keeps his own qubit intact until the other members an-
nounce their information on the bases, and then takes
his own basis dependent on |S〉 to prohibit the bit from
being discarded. Because the chairperson needs informa-
tion on |S〉, a collector in A should play the chairperson.
We clearly remark that any member can play the chair-
person if all members in A have the information on |S〉.
To obtain a more efficient protocol, Step 3 and 4 in the
previous protocol are modified as the followings.
3′. Except the chairperson each member in the two
groups randomly performs a measurement on his
own particle either in x- or y-direction.
4′. (a) Let A′ be the group consisting of all members
in A except the chairperson. All members in
A′ and B announce the measurement bases.
Then the two groups get NA′y and NBy , respec-
tively. Now, the collector in B never plays the
last member.
(b) Using the properties of cat states, the chair-
person performs the measurement on his par-
ticle depending on NA′y + NBy and |S〉 in or-
der to prevent the shared bit from being dis-
carded.
We remark that the order of the basis announcements
of two groups is not important in this protocol because
NAy is determined by NBy and |S〉.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SECURITY
In this section, we analyze security of our protocols.
Firstly, we discuss the case that several members have
some wrong behavior. The second case treat an eaves-
dropper who uses the intercept/resend strategy [10]. We
again divide the second case into two cases according
to the existence of members who give an eavesdropper
some helps. Since the protocols should be secure even if
all members in A share the information on |S〉 before the
transmission of the particles in the first step, we assume
that all members in A know the information.
A. Members with wrong behaviors
In this part, we discuss that when there are some mem-
bers who behave wrong if two groups, particularly the
4collectors, have the faulty key strings then they can no-
tice it from the test.
To begin with, we treat a chairperson in the modified
protocol. The measurement basis of the chairperson is
exactly determined by the other members’ ones and the
state |S〉. Thus, he cannot change his basis arbitrarily,
and can affect only his measurement result. From the
above fact, we clearly obtain that he can have no more
influence on the key information than the other members’
one. Therefore, it suffices to consider the investigation of
the other members’ behavior.
We think over all members’ behavior except the col-
lector’s one. Because PA (or PB) is possessed by just a
collector, any member except the collector cannot know
it and hence cannot notice the shared bit. While some
members are having behavior wrong, they cannot per-
ceive what is the key bit made by their actions. More-
over, before the test step they cannot perceive if errors
will be detected in the test step and what are the bit
stings used to test. Hence, the nonexistence of errors
in sufficiently many test bits implies that almost all the
key bits have correct correlations (or anti-correlations).
Since the collectors only possess the shared bits, if the
bits have the correct correlations (or anti-correlations)
the two groups can share correct keys although there ex-
ist some members to behave wrong. Therefore, if some
members have a wrong effect on some of bit strings and
if the two groups share the faulty bit strings, then they
can find errors from sufficiently many test bits.
B. Eavesdropper and conspirators in two groups
Suppose that there are an eavesdropper and some
members who assist her. Here, the eavesdropper and the
members are called ‘Eve’ and ‘conspirators’, respectively.
We first discuss that without assistance of conspirators
Eve uses the intercept/resend strategy [10], and then dis-
cuss that with some helps of conspirators Eve uses such
strategy and the l-particle entangled state to resend to
B. Finally it is treated that under the same strategy
Eve uses the n′-particle entangled state to resend to B
(n′ > l).
1. No conspirator in intercept/resend strategy
We consider that Eve uses the intercept/resend strat-
egy, i.e., Eve intercepts l particles travelling from A to B,
performs a measurement on that particles, and resends
an l-particle fake state instead. Even if Eve chooses a
fake state according to the measurement result and re-
sends it, the two groups will detect an error in the shared
bit with probability 1
8
for the original protocol, and with
probability 1
4
for the modified protocol, respectively. The
difference of probability comes from the nonexistence of
the discarded bits in the modified protocol. Hence, the
two groups can find errors for sufficiently many test bits.
2. Using intercept/resend strategy: Eve and conspirators
We consider that Eve adopts the intercept/resend
strategy and has some conspirators in two groups. First
conspirators should try to changeNAy , NBy , PA or PB, to
make no errors which are caused by Eve’s eavesdropping.
However, as stated in Section IVA, it is impossible for
any member except the collector to change PA and PB
into what they want. In addition, any member except the
last members can never change NAy and NBy into what
they want. Thus, it suffices to treat the case that one
more conspirator plays collectors (or last members) un-
der assumption that the collector (or the last members)
is played in rotation by each member.
We assume that Eve eavesdrops with the probability
λ, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 using the intercept/resend strategy; λ = 0
means that Eve is not eavesdropping at all. Let ra be
the number of conspirators in A and rb the number of
conspirators in B. The two groups randomly select t
shard bits in order to estimate the error rate. In the first
protocol, Eve’s eavesdropping then causes at least the
following error rates according to ra and rb.
In the case that ra = 0 and rb ≥ 1, we have
1−
(
7
8
)λt(1− rb−1
l
)
. (9)
Applying Eve’s the measurement result on the inter-
cepted particles, they can notice the values of NBy and
PB to make no errors. For example, in the case that the
measurement result is
∣∣Φ+l 〉, if NBy is even andMBy +PB
is 0 then there is no error. So, only having assistance
of a collector and a last member in B at once, they can
forbid errors to be caused. They have the chance with
ratio rb−1
l
for one shared bit, i.e., the conspirators in B
can play a collector and a last member simultaneously
with the ratio. Hence Equation (9) is obtained.
We note that if a last member is a collector in B then
the ratio becomes greater than rb−1
l
. Thus, in the first
protocol, a last member can never be the identical person
with a collector during one key agreement.
In the case ra ≥ 1 and rb = 0, we have
1−
(
7
8
)λt(1− ra−1k )
. (10)
From the information on |S〉 and Eve’s measurement re-
sult they can find the suitable values for NAy and PA
which induce no error. Thus Eve and conspirators in A
can change these values into the found suitable ones, only
if the conspirators play the collector and the last member
in A simultaneously. Hence Equation (10) is found. It
also becomes the reason that a last member in A never
plays a collector.
In the case ra ≥ 1 and rb ≥ 1, we have
1−
(
7
8
)λt[(1− ra−1k )(1− rb+1l )]
. (11)
5In this case, it is clear that they are able to use two
methods discussed in the above paragraphs. In addition,
they are able to change NBy to make the shared bit be
discarded, or change PB to make no error by means of
information on NAy , NBy , PA and |S〉. To do so, they
need assistance of any conspirator in A for |S〉 and either
the collector or the last member in B. The rate that
such cases occur in B is rb+1
l
. Therefore, we obtain the
Equation (11).
Furthermore, we perceive that NAy have to be an-
nounced before NBy . This is because if not, Eve is able
to make no errors even with assistance of either the col-
lector or the last member in A without any conspirator
in B.
Now, we can notice that the probability in Equations
(9) and (10) are not less than in Equation (11). So it is
sufficient to treat only Equation (11).
For case of rb = l− 1, the probability in Equation (11)
is 0 and then this protocol is not secure, but it is not
so in the modified protocol which will be treated later.
Next, we consider the case, ra = k − 1 and rb = l − 2.
1−
(
7
8
)λt[(1− ra−1k )(1− rb+1l )]
≥ 0.95. (12)
if and only if
(
1− ra − 1
k
)(
1− rb + 1
l
)
=
2
k · l λt ≥ 270. (13)
Though ra = k − 1 and ra = l − 2, their existence
can be detected with probability 0.95 by choosing suffi-
ciently many test bits which satisfy λt ≥ 135kl . From
the equations we can know that by making test bits be
increased, even for extreme cases, eavesdropping can also
be detected with as high probability as the two groups
need. However, the more many test bits are required to
detect Eve’s eavesdropping as the rate of existence of the
conspirators increases.
We remark that quite many test bits should be chosen
in the case that ra = k − 1 and rb = l − 2. Hence, upon
all members’ deliberation for presumption of the number
of members that can behave wrong, the number of test
bits can effectively be modulated.
We now consider the case that ra and rb are not more
than a half of the number of all members in A and B,
respectively. The probability in Equation (11) is larger
than 0.95 if and only if
λt
(
1− ra − 1
k
)(
1− rb + 1
l
)
=
2
k · l ≥ 22.44 (14)
Then if ra
k
and rb
l
are fixed, the probability increases as
k’s value increases or l’s one decreases. From comparisons
between Figures 2 and 4, and between Figures 3 and 4,
we can certainly perceive the above facts.
If ra
k
≤ 1
2
, rb
l
≤ 1
2
and λ = 1, it follows from the
condition l > 2 that the number of required test bits is
FIG. 2: The probability in Equation (11) when k = 6, l = 4
and ra = 3.
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FIG. 3: The probability in Equation (11) when k = 4, l = 6
and ra = 2.
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not less than 270. However, for fixed k and l the fewer
number of test bits are required. The change of the error
rate according to the number of test bits is exemplified
in Tables II for the case that ra
k
≤ 1
2
and rb
l
≤ 1
2
The probability in the modified protocol has a little
difference from the primary protocol because there are
no discarded bits and NAy is determined by NBy and |S〉.
By removing the strategy to use NAy we can easily get
the following error rates of the modified protocol.
In the case ra = 0,
1−
(
3
4
)(1− rb−1
l
)
λt
. (15)
In the case ra ≥ 1,
1−
(
3
4
)(1− rbl )λt
. (16)
As in the case of the first protocol, we analyze just the
case ra ≥ 1. The error rate in Equation (16) has no
connections with the values of ra and k, and depends just
on rb and l. For rb = l−1, we require only t that satisfies
λt ≥ 10.4l. For rb
l
= 1
2
, it becomes λt ≥ 21.4. In the
modified protocol, we can notice that two groups require
remarkably smaller test bits than the first protocol, and
furthermore errors can be detected from the test step
6FIG. 4: The probability in Equation (11) when k = 6, l = 6
and ra = 3.
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TABLE II: The probability in Equation (11) when k = 6,
l = 6 and ra = 3
❅
❅rb
t
20 40 60 80 100 120 140
1 0.6948 0.9069 0.9716 0.9913 0.9974 0.9992 0.9998
2 0.5894 0.8314 0.9308 0.9716 0.9883 0.9952 0.998
3 0.4476 0.6948 0.8314 0.9069 0.9486 0.9716 0.9843
even in the cases l = 2 or, ra = k − 1 and rb = l − 1,
while errors cannot be detected for the case in the first
protocol.
We remark that if just a collector can take the infor-
mation on |S〉 or only one member plays the collector for
all shared bits then a fewer test bits would be required.
3. Intercept/resend strategy using entangled states
We assume that Eve intercepts l particles travelling
from A to B, and call this state ‘the intercepted state’.
She chooses an n′-particle cat state and resends l particles
of this cat state to B (n′ > l). We refer to the remainder
(n′ − l)-particle state as ‘the remainder state’.
Before announcement ofNAy (or NBy ) the measurement
of the intercepted state (or the remainder state) cannot
give her the information on PA (or PB). So she should
measure on the intercepted state and the remainder state,
after NAy and NBy are announced. Even though she mea-
sures in the way, she should have the information on |S〉
to obtain PA, since PA is completely determined by |S〉
and NAy . In order to take information on |S〉, she needs
any conspirator in A.
On the other hand, she wants to change PA or PB into
the values she desires to prevent errors from occurring.
Thus she needs collectors’ assistance in A or B. Without
any conspirators the test induces errors with probability
1
4
in the first protocol and probability 1
2
in the modi-
fied protocol, respectively. For these facts Eve’s strategy
makes at least the following error rate in the first proto-
col.
In the case ra = 0,
1−
(
3
4
)λt
. (17)
In the case ra ≥ 1,
1−
(
3
4
)λt(1− rak )(1− rbl )
. (18)
In the modified protocol the error rates are similar to
the first protocol, because Eve cannot have a different
strategy. From these equations we can know that this
strategy is not optimal to Eve.
V. SUMMARY
Applying the properties of cat states and the secret
sharing [6], we proposed two generalized QKD protocols
between two groups and showed that the protocols are
secure against an external eavesdropper using the inter-
cept/resend strategy. The importance of these protocols
is that any member in the two groups cannot obtain the
secret key strings without cooperation, that is, the se-
cret key strings can be obtained only under all member’s
approval.
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